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Abstract
Coin flipping is a fundamental cryptographic primitive that enables two distrustful and
far apart parties to create a uniformly random bit [Blu81]. Quantum information allows for
protocols in the information theoretic setting where no dishonest party can perfectly cheat.
The previously best-known quantum protocol by Ambainis achieved a cheating probability of
at most 3/4 [Amb01]. On the other hand, Kitaev showed that no quantum protocol can have
cheating probability less than 1/
√
2 [Kit03]. Closing this gap has been one of the important
open questions in quantum cryptography.
In this paper, we resolve this question by presenting a quantum strong coin flipping protocol
with cheating probability arbitrarily close to 1/
√
2. More precisely, we show how to use any
weak coin flipping protocol with cheating probability 1/2 + ε in order to achieve a strong coin
flipping protocol with cheating probability 1/
√
2 + O(ε). The optimal quantum strong coin
flipping protocol follows from our construction and the optimal quantum weak coin flipping
protocol described by Mochon [Moc07].
1 Introduction
Coin flipping is a cryptographic primitive that enables two distrustful and far apart parties, Alice
and Bob, to create a random bit that remains unbiased even if one of the players tries to force a spe-
cific outcome. It was first proposed by Blum [Blu81] and has since found numerous applications in
two-party secure computation. In the classical world, coin flipping is possible under computational
assumptions like the hardness of factoring or the discrete log problem. However, in the information
theoretic setting, it is not hard to see that in any classical protocol, one of the players can always
bias the coin to his or her desired outcome with probability 1.
Quantum information has given us the opportunity to revisit information theoretic security in
cryptography. The first breakthrough result was a protocol of Bennett and Brassard [BB84] that
showed how to securely distribute a secret key between two players in the presence of an omnipo-
tent eavesdropper. Thenceforth, a long series of work has focused on which other cryptographic
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primitives are possible with the help of quantum information. Unfortunately, the subsequent re-
sults were not positive. Mayers and Lo, Chau proved the impossibility of secure quantum bit
commitment and oblivious transfer and consequently of any type of two-party secure computa-
tion [May97, LC97, DKSW07]. However, several weaker variants of these primitives have been
shown to be possible [HK04, BCH+08].
The case of coin flipping is one of the most intriguing ones. Even though the results of Mayers
and of Lo and Chau exclude the possibility of perfect quantum coin flipping, i.e. where the resulting
coin is perfectly unbiased, it still remained open whether one can construct a quantum protocol
where no player could bias the coin with probability 1. A few years later, Aharonov et al. [ATVY00]
provided such a protocol where no dishonest player could bias the coin with probability higher than
0.9143. Then, Ambainis [Amb01] described an improved protocol whose cheating probability was
at most 3/4. Subsequently, a number of different protocols have been proposed [SR01, NS03, KN04]
that achieved the same bound of 3/4.
On the other hand, Kitaev [Kit03], using a formulation of quantum coin flipping protocols as
semi-definite programs proved a lower bound of 1/2 on the product of the two cheating probabilities
for Alice and Bob (for a proof see e.g. [ABDR04]). In other words, no quantum coin flipping
protocol can achieve a cheating probability less than 1/
√
2 for both Alice and Bob.
The question of whether 3/4 or 1/
√
2 is ultimately the right bound for quantum coin flipping
has been open since then. In fact, there had been “evidence” suggesting both cases. First, Kitaev’s
semi-definite program formulation of coin flipping seems to be a natural one and using this semi-
definite program one cannot hope to prove a better lower bound. On the other hand, most of the
suggested coin flipping protocols were using some form of imperfect bit commitment scheme. More
precisely, Alice would quantumly commit to a bit a, Bob would announce a bit b and then Alice
would reveal her bit a. The outcome of the coin flip would be a⊕b. However, Ambainis had proved
a lower bound of 3/4 for any protocol of this type and even though more complicated protocols
based on similar ideas had been proposed, they all seemed to get stuck at the same 3/4 bound.
During the study of quantum coin flipping, a weaker variant was introduced that is referred
to as weak coin flipping in opposition to the original strong coin flipping. In this setting, Alice
and Bob have a priori a desired coin outcome, in other words the two values of the coin can be
thought of as ‘Alice wins’ and ‘Bob wins’. We are again interested in bounding the probability that
a dishonest player can win this game.
Weak coin flipping protocols with cheating probabilities less than 3/4 were constructed in [SR02,
Amb02, KN04]. The best achieved bound was in fact 1/
√
2, a strange coincidence, since Kitaev’s
lower bound of 1/
√
2 does not apply in the case of weak coin flipping. The only lower bound
that carries over from the case of strong coin flipping is a bound by Ambainis that shows that
in order to achieve a cheating probability of 1/2 + ε the protocol must have at least O(log log 1
ε
)
rounds [Amb02]. We refer to ε as the bias of the protocol.
Finally, a breakthrough result by Mochon resolved the question of the optimal quantum weak
coin flipping. First, he described a protocol with cheating probability 2/3 [Moc04, Moc05] and
then a protocol that achieves a cheating probability of 1/2 + ε for any ε > 0 [Moc07]. Kitaev’s
formalism and Mochon’s optimal weak coin flipping protocol delve heavily into the theory of convex
cones and operator monotone functions.
In this work, we resolve the question of the optimal quantum strong coin flipping protocol. We
present a general method on how to use any weak coin-flipping protocol with cheating probability
1/2+ ε in order to construct a strong coin-flipping protocol with cheating probability 1/
√
2+O(ε).
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Our protocol uses roughly the same number of rounds as the weak coin flipping protocol. Combining
our construction with Mochon’s quantum weak coin flipping protocol that achieves arbitrarily small
bias, we conclude that it is possible to construct a quantum strong coin flipping protocol with
cheating probability arbitrarily close to 1√
2
.
Let us make a few remarks about our protocol. First, it is a classical protocol that uses a
weak coin flipping as a subroutine. In other words, in coin flipping, the power of quantum really
comes from the ability to perform weak coin flipping. If there existed a classical weak coin flipping
protocol with arbitrarily small bias, then this would have implied a classical strong coin flipping
protocol with cheating probability arbitrarily close to 1/
√
2 as well. Moreover, our protocol has
the advantages of being very easy to describe and having a straightforward analysis, assuming, of
course, the existence of a weak coin flipping protocol.
Using weak coin flipping in order to perform strong coin flipping is not a new idea. There
is a trivial protocol that uses a perfect weak coin flipping and achieves strong coin flipping with
cheating probability 3/4: Alice and Bob run the weak coin flipping protocol and whoever wins,
flips a random coin c ∈R {0, 1}.
Our protocol can be thought of as a refinement of the abovementioned one. There are two simple
ideas that we use. First, we will have Alice flip and announce the outcome of her random coin
before Alice and Bob perform the weak coin flipping protocol. Second, we will use an “unbalanced”
weak coin flipping, where in the honest case, Alice wins with probability z and Bob with probability
1− z.
We can now describe informally our protocol
Strong Coin Flipping Protocol
• Alice flips a random coin a and sends a to Bob.
• Alice and Bob run an unbalanced weak coin flipping protocol where honest Alice wins
with probability z and honest Bob with probability 1− z.
• If Alice wins, the output is a.
• If Bob wins, he outputs a with probability p and a with probability 1− p.
In Section 4, we first show how to construct “unbalanced” weak coin flipping protocols for any
z and bias O(ε), assuming the existence of a “balanced” weak coin flipping protocol with bias ε.
Then, we optimize the parameters z and p in order to make the cheating probability of our protocol
at most 1/
√
2 +O(ε).
2 Definitions
We provide the formal definitions of all the different variants of coin flipping protocols that we are
going to use.
A coin flipping protocol between two parties Alice and Bob is a protocol where Alice and
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Bob interact and at the end, Alice outputs a value cA ∈ {0, 1,Abort} and Bob outputs a value
cB ∈ {0, 1,Abort}. If cA = cB , we say that the protocol outputs c = cA. If cA 6= cB then the
protocol outputs c = Abort.
In a coin flipping protocol, we call a round of communication one message from Alice to Bob
and one message from Bob to Alice. We suppose that Alice always sends the first message and Bob
always sends the last message. The protocol is quantum if we allow the parties to send quantum
messages and perform quantum operations. A player is honest if he or she follows the protocol. A
cheating player can deviate arbitrarily from the protocol but still outputs a value at the end of it.
There are two important variants of coin flipping that have been studied.
Weak coin flipping
A (balanced) weak coin flipping protocol with bias ε (WCF (1/2, ε)) has the following properties
• If c = 0, we say that Alice wins. If c = 1, we say that Bob wins.
• If Alice and Bob are honest then Pr [ Alice wins ] = Pr [ Bob wins ] = 1/2
• If Alice cheats and Bob is honest then P ∗
A
= Pr [ Alice wins ] ≤ 1/2 + ε
• If Bob cheats and Alice is honest then P ∗
B
= Pr [ Bob wins ] ≤ 1/2 + ε
The probabilities P ∗
A
and P ∗
B
are called the cheating probabilities of Alice and Bob respectively.
The cheating probability of the protocol is defined as max{P ∗
A
, P ∗
B
}. We say that the coin flipping
is perfect if ε = 0.
We can also define weak coin flipping for the case where the winning probabilities of the two
players in the honest case are not equal.
Unbalanced weak coin flipping
A weak coin flipping protocol with parameter z and bias ε (WCF (z, ε)) has the following prop-
erties.
• If c = 0, we say that Alice wins. If c = 1, we say that Bob wins.
• If Alice and Bob are honest then Pr [ Alice wins ] = z and Pr [ Bob wins ] = 1− z
• If Alice cheats and Bob is honest then P ∗
A
= Pr [ Alice wins ] ≤ z + ε
• If Bob cheats and Alice is honest then P ∗
B
= Pr [ Bob wins ] ≤ (1− z) + ε
Strong coin flipping
A strong coin flipping protocol with bias ε (SCF (ε)) has the following properties
• If Alice and Bob are honest then Pr [c = 0] = Pr [c = 1] = 1/2
• If Alice cheats and Bob is honest then P ∗
A
= max{Pr [c = 0] ,Pr [c = 1]} ≤ 1/2 + ε.
• If Bob cheats and Alice is honest then P ∗
B
= max{Pr [c = 0] ,Pr [c = 1]} ≤ 1/2 + ε
Similarly, P ∗
A
and P ∗
B
are the cheating probabilities of Alice and Bob. The cheating probability of
the protocol is defined as max{P ∗
A
, P ∗
B
}.
We will also use the following result by Mochon
Proposition 1 [Moc07] For every ε > 0, there exists a quantum WCF (1/2, ε) protocol P .
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3 An optimal strong coin flipping protocol
In this section, we describe how to construct an optimal strong coin flipping protocol from any
weak coin flipping protocol. Let us try to give some intuition for our protocol before we actually
describe and analyze it. For this high level discussion, we assume the existence of a perfect weak
coin flipping protocol. As we said, there exists a trivial protocol that uses a weak coin flipping in
order to achieve strong coin flipping:
SCF(3/4) protocol using a perfect weak coin flipping protocol P
• Alice and Bob run the protocol P
• The winner chooses a random c ∈R {0, 1}, and sends c to the other player, c being the outcome
of the protocol.
Let us analyze this protocol more closely. Let Alice be dishonest and her desired value for the
coin be 0. Her strategy will be to try and win the WCF protocol, which happens with probability
1/2 and then output 0. However, even if she loses the weak coin flipping, there is still a probability
1/2 that the honest Bob will output 0. Hence, Alice’s (and by symmetry Bob’s) cheating probability
is 3/4.
In order to reduce this bias, we would like to eliminate the situation where the honest player,
after winning the WCF, still helps the dishonest player cheat with probability 1/2. One can try
to resolve this problem by having Alice flip and announce her random coin c before running the
WCF protocol. In this case: first, Alice announces a bit a. Then, Alice and Bob perform a WCF.
If Alice wins the outcome is a; if Bob wins then the outcome is a.
In this case, Bob never outputs a. However, there is a simple cheating strategy for Alice. If she
wants 0, she sets a = 1, loses the WCF (which she can do with probability 1) and therefore Bob
always outputs 0. Hence, Bob’s choice when he wins the WCF must be probabilistic. Let us now
consider the following protocol:
Improved SCF protocol using a perfect weak coin flipping protocol P
• Alice picks a random bit a ∈R {0, 1} and sends a to Bob.
• Alice and Bob run P .
• If Alice wins then the outcome is a.
• If Bob wins then he outputs a with probability p and a with probability 1− p.
First note that Bob’s cheating probability is 3/4, independent of p. Namely, if Alice picks the
value Bob wants, then he just loses the WCF; if Alice picks the opposite value then he tries to win
the WCF in order to pick his desired value. On the other hand, let us calculate Alice’s cheating
probability. Alice can pick a to be equal to her desired outcome, in which case the final outcome
is a with probability 12 · 1 + 12 · p. She may also pick a to be the opposite of her desired outcome,
in which case she always loses the WCF and hence, the final outcome is a with probability 1 − p.
Alice’s cheating probability is the maximum of the two cases. By choosing p = 1/3 the probabilities
in the two cases are equal and we conclude that Alice’s cheating probability is 2/3.
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Hence, using any balanced WCF protocol, we can have a strong coin flipping protocol that
achieves cheating probability 3/4 for Bob and 2/3 for Alice. This in some sense already beats the
best previously known protocol that can only achieve cheating probability 3/4 for both Alice and
Bob.
Our next step is to make these two cheating probabilities equal. For this, we will use an
unbalanced WCF with parameter z and optimize z and p in order to get the optimal bound of
1/
√
2.
We can now describe our final protocol that uses a WCF (z, ε) protocol Q as a subroutine.
Strong Coin Flipping protocol S
1. Alice chooses a ∈R {0, 1} and sends a to Bob.
2. Alice and Bob perform the WCF (z, ε) protocol Q
• If Alice wins Q then honest players output cA = cB = a
• If Bob wins Q then he flips a coin b such that b = a with probability p and b = a
with probability (1− p). He sends b to Alice. In this case, honest players output
cA = cB = b.
• If Q outputs Abort then Abort
4 Analysis of the strong coin flipping protocol S
We first describe the construction of the unbalanced WCF (z, ε) protocol and then show how to
optimize the parameters z and p in order to achieve the optimal bias.
4.1 An unbalanced weak coin flipping protocol
Our goal is to prove the following proposition
Proposition 2 Let P be a WCF (1/2, ε) protocol with N rounds. Then, ∀z ∈ [0, 1] and ∀k ∈ N,
there exists a WCF (x, ε0) protocol Q such that:
• Q uses k ·N rounds.
• |x− z| ≤ 2−k.
• ε0 ≤ 2ε.
The protocol Q is a sequential composition of the WCF (1/2, ε) protocol P . In high level, we
use P in order to combine two weak coin flipping protocols with parameters z1 and z2 into a new
protocol with parameter z1+z22 . Then, by recursion, for any given z we can create a protocol Q
with parameter x that rapidly converges to z. We also prove that the bias of Q is at most 2ε.
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Assume we have a WCF (z1, ε0) protocol P1 and a WCF (z2, ε0) protocol P2 each with at most
M rounds of communication and z2 ≥ z1. We combine them in the following way.
Comb(P1,P2)
• Alice and Bob run P .
• If Alice wins, run P2. If Bob wins, run P1. If P Aborts then Abort.
Note that this protocol uses at most N +M rounds. We have
Lemma 1 Comb(P1, P2) is a WCF (
z1+z2
2 , ε0 + ε(z2 − z1)) protocol.
Proof:
Alice and Bob are honest If Alice and Bob are honest then the protocol never aborts. We have
Pr[ Alice wins ] = z1+z22 and Pr[ Bob wins ] = 1− z1+z22 .
Alice cheats and Bob is honest Let x = Pr[Alice wins P] ; y = Pr[Bob wins P]; u = Pr[Alice
wins P2 | Alice wins P]; v = Pr[Alice wins P1 | Bob wins P]. We know the following inequalities
concerning these probabilities:
x+ y ≤ 1 x ≤ 1/2 + ε u ≤ z2 + ε0 v ≤ z1 + ε0
Note that the last two inequalities hold, since the biases for the protocols P1 and P2 do not
increase depending on the outcome of P . We have
Pr [ Alice wins Comb(P1, P2)]
= x · u+ y · v ≤ x(z2 + ε0) + (1− x)(z1 + ε0) = (z1 + ε0) + x(z2 − z1)
≤ (z1 + ε0) + (1/2 + ε)(z2 − z1) since z2 ≥ z1
≤ z1 + z2
2
+ ε0 + ε(z2 − z1)
Bob cheats and Alice is honest Using a similar calculation as in the previous case, we have
Pr[Bob wins Comb(P1, P2)] ≤ (1−z2)+(1−z1)2 + ε0 + ε(z2 − z1) = 1− z1+z22 + ε0 + ε(z2 − z1).
We now show the following inductive Lemma
Lemma 2 Suppose we have a WCF (1/2, ε) protocol P that uses N rounds of communication.
Then ∀z ∈ [0, 1] and ∀k ∈ N, we can construct a WCF (x1, ε0) protocol P1 and a WCF (x2, ε0)
protocol P2 such that
• P1, P2 each use at most k ·N rounds.
• x1 ≤ z ≤ x2 and x2 − x1 = 2−k.
• ε0 ≤ (2− 2(x2 − x1))ε.
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Proof: Fix z ∈ [0, 1]. We show this result by induction on k. For k = 0, we clearly have a
WCF (0, 0) protocol (a protocol where Bob always wins) and a WCF (1, 0) (a protocol where Alice
always wins) that use no rounds of communication. We suppose the Lemma is true for k and we
show it for k + 1.
Let x1, x2, P1, P2, ε0 that satisfy the above properties for k. Let P
′ be the Comb(P1, P2) protocol
and u = x1+x22 . P
′ uses at most (k + 1)N rounds and from Lemma 1, we know that P ′ is a
WCF (u, ε′0 = ε0 + (x2 − x1)ε) protocol. From the induction step we have that ε′0 ≤ (2 − 2(x2 −
x1))ε + (x2 − x1)ε ≤ (2− (x2 − x1))ε. We now distinguish two cases
• If z ≤ u, consider the protocols P1 and P ′. Each one uses at most (k + 1)N rounds. Also,
x1 ≤ z ≤ u and u− x1 = x2−x12 = 2−(k+1). Finally, ε′0 ≤ (2 − (x2 − x1))ε = (2 − 2(u − x1))ε
which concludes the proof.
• If z > u, consider the protocols P ′ and P2. Each one uses at most (k + 1)N rounds. Also,
u ≤ z ≤ x2 and x2 − u = x2−x12 = 2−(k+1). Finally, ε′0 ≤ (2 − (x2 − x1))ε = (2 − 2(x2 − u))ε
which concludes the proof.
In Lemma 2, we have |x1 − z| ≤ (x2 − x1) ≤ 2−k and ε0 ≤ 2ε. Hence this Lemma directly
implies Proposition 2 by considering Q = P1.
4.2 Strong coin flipping from unbalanced weak coin flipping
We calculate the cheating probability of our protocol S that uses a WCF (z, ε) protocol Q.
Proposition 3 The protocol S is a strong coin flipping protocol with N +2 rounds of communica-
tion and cheating probabilities P ∗
A
≤ 12−z−ε and P ∗B ≤ 2−z+ε2 .
Proof:
Alice and Bob are honest If both players are honest then they never abort. Moreover, since the
protocol is symmetric in 0 and 1, we have Pr [c = 0] = Pr [c = 1] = 1/2.
Alice cheats and Bob is honest We prove that Pr [c = 0] ≤ 12−z−ε . By symmetry, the same
holds for Pr [c = 1]. Since Alice cheats, she can choose arbitrarily between a = 0 and a = 1 instead
of picking a uniformly at random. Hence, Pr[c = 0] ≤ max{Pr [c = 0|a = 0] ,Pr [c = 0|a = 1]}.
• We first calculate Pr [c = 0|a = 0].
Let x = Pr [Alice wins Q|a = 0] and y = Pr [Bob wins Q|a = 0]. We have Pr [c = 0|a = 0] =
x · 1+ y · p. Note that x+ y ≤ 1 and also x ≤ z+ ε, since the maximum bias with which Alice
can win Q is independent of the value of a. We have
Pr [c = 0|a = 0] = x · 1 + y · p ≤ x+ (1− x)p = p+ x(1− p)
≤ p+ (z + ε)(1 − p)
• We now calculate Pr [c = 0|a = 1].
Let x = Pr [Alice wins Q|a = 1] and y = Pr [Bob wins Q|a = 1]. We have
Pr [c = 0|a = 1] = x · 0 + y(1− p) ≤ y(1− p) ≤ 1− p
which is achievable since Alice could always let Bob win Q.
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Since Pr [c = 0] ≤ max{Pr [c = 0|a = 0] ,Pr [c = 0|a = 1]}, we choose p such that the upper bounds
for Pr [c = 0|a = 0] and Pr [c = 0|a = 1] are equal.
p+ (z + ε)(1 − p) = 1− p
p =
1− z − ε
2− z − ε
With this value of p, we have
Pr[c = 0] ≤ max{Pr [c = 0|a = 0] ,Pr [c = 0|a = 1]} = 1− p ≤ 1
2− z − ε
Since the protocol is symmetric in 0 and 1, we also have Pr [c = 1] ≤ 12−z−ε and hence P ∗A ≤ 12−z−ε .
Bob cheats and Alice is honestWe prove that Pr [c = 0] ≤ 2−z+ε2 . By symmetry, the same holds
for Pr [c = 1]. Alice is honest and picks a uniformly at random. We first have Pr [c = 0|a = 0] ≤ 1.
We now upper bound Pr [c = 0|a = 1]. Let x = Pr [Bob wins Q|a = 1] and y = Pr [Alice wins Q|a = 1].
We have
Pr [c = 0|a = 1] ≤ x · 1 + y · 0 ≤ x ≤ 1− z + ε
Since Alice is honest, we have Pr [a = 0] = Pr [a = 1] = 1/2 and hence:
Pr [c = 0] = Pr [c = 0|a = 0] · Pr [a = 0] + Pr [c = 0|a = 1] · Pr [a = 1]
=
1
2
(Pr [c = 0|a = 0] + Pr [c = 0|a = 1])
≤ 1
2
+
1− z + ε
2
=
2− z + ε
2
Since the protocol is symmetric in 0 and 1, we also have Pr [c = 1] ≤ 2−z+ε2 and hence P ∗B ≤ 2−z+ε2 .
4.3 Putting it all together
To conclude, we have to optimize z. In the case where there exists an ideal weak coin flipping
protocol WCF (1/2, 0), it is easy to see that in order to equalize the cheating probabilities P ∗
A
and
P ∗
B
, we need to take z = 2−√2. If also our Proposition 2 was ideal, i.e. if from P we could create
perfectly a WCF (2−√2, 0) protocol Q, then S would have cheating probability exactly 1√
2
.
In general, we need to take care of the small bias ε of the initial WCF (1/2, ε) protocol P
and the error of our Proposition 2. However, we will see that the overall increase in the cheating
probability of our protocol S is only O(ε).
Theorem 1 If there exists a WCF (1/2, ε) protocol P that uses N rounds of communication then
there exists a strong coin flipping protocol S that uses 2⌈log(1
ε
)⌉ · N + 2 rounds with cheating
probability at most 1√
2
+
√
2ε+ o(ε).
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Proof: Starting from the WCF (1/2, ε) weak coin flipping protocol P with N rounds, we can
use Proposition 2 with k = 2⌈log(1
ε
)⌉ and construct a WCF (x, ε′) protocol Q with the following
properties
• Q uses 2⌈log(1
ε
)⌉ ·N rounds.
• |x− (2−√2)| ≤ ε2.
• ε′ ≤ 2ε.
Then, we use the protocol Q in the strong coin flipping protocol S we described in Section 3
and by Proposition 3 we have that S has 2⌈log(1
ε
)⌉ ·N + 2 rounds and
P ∗A =
1
2− x− ε′ ≤
1√
2− 2ε− ε2 ≤
1√
2
+
√
2ε+ o(ε)
P ∗B =
2− x+ ε′
2
≤
√
2 + 2ε + ε2
2
=
1√
2
+ ε+ o(ε)
Using Theorem 1 and Mochon’s weak coin flipping protocol (Proposition 1) we conclude that
Corollary 1 For any ε > 0, there exists a strong coin flipping protocol with cheating probability
1√
2
+ ε.
Last, note that our strong coin flipping protocol uses O(N · log(1
ε
)) rounds, where N is the
number of rounds of Mochon’s weak coin flipping protocol.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented the first quantum strong coin flipping protocol with a cheating prob-
ability arbitrarily close to the optimal value 1√
2
. Our protocol uses as a subroutine the quantum
weak coin flipping protocol designed by Mochon which is arbitrarily close to optimal. Note that
except when using this quantum weak coin flipping protocol, our entire protocol is classical.
We would like to note that Mochon’s protocol is still not very well understood (protocol’s
unitary description, number of rounds). It is important to get a better understanding of that
protocol and/or find a simpler construction of an optimal quantum weak coin flipping protocol.
Moreover, it would be interesting to study what other cryptographic primitives can be derived from
weak or strong coin flipping.
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